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STRIKE THAT, REVERSE IT:* COUNTY OF WAYNE v. HATHCOCK:
MICHIGAN REDEFINES IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EMINENT DOMAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, from Charleston, West Virginia to Las Vegas, Ne-
vada, communities are facing the aggressive employment of eminent do-
main.' Eminent domain refers to the power of government to seize
property from landowners. 2 The government's power is constrained only
by constitutional requirements of public use and just compensation.3
* See ROALD DAHL, CHARLIE AND THE GREAT GLASS ELEVATOR 3 (Puffin Books
1998) (1972).
1. See James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed? Reconsidering the
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 30, 31
(noting renewed interest in eminent domain as result of "aggressive exercise of the
eminent domain power to acquire private property"); Marc Ferris, A Heated Dispute
in Newark, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, § 14NJ, at 6 (reporting efforts of property
owners in Newark, New Jersey to fight taking of their property for new condomini-
ums and retail stores); Las Vegas Settles with Family over Seized Land, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
30, 2004, at 19 (relaying details of settlement between City of Las Vegas and prop-
erty owner for taking of property for garage); Terry Pristin, Connecticut Homeowners
Say Eminent Domain Isn't a Revenue-Raising Device, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at C8
(detailing continued efforts to fight use of eminent domain to remove homes and
small businesses in favor of development in New London, Connecticut); Mandy
Rorrer, Judge to Decide CURA's Eminent Domain Rights, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.
Va.), Sept. 2, 2004, at 6A (reporting that court will decide whether Charleston
Urban Renewal Authority may use eminent domain to take property for grocery
store); Joseph P. Smith, Condemnation Threat Looms in Millville, DAILY J. (Vineland,
N.J.), Aug. 19, 2004, at IA (relating efforts to persuade Millville, NewJersey prop-
erty owners to sell their land to allow for new $40 million shopping center and
noting that city commission drafted ordinance authorizing use of eminent do-
main, but tabled it until at least September 2004); Anthony S. Twyman, Fighting
Eminent Domain's Expansion, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 2004 (relating takings in Phil-
adelphia, Pennsylvania as part of Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, and
takings in Camden, New Jersey for redevelopment), available at http://www.philly.
com/mld/inquirer/news/local/9290808.htm?lc; Dana Berliner, Public Power, Pri-
vate Gain: A Five-Year, State-by-State Report Examining the Abuse of Eminent Domain
(April 2003), at http://www.ij.org/publications/castle (reporting study prepared
on behalf of pro-property rights group, Institute for Justice, that minimum of
10,000 filed or threatened condemnations for private parties occurred over five
years from 1998-2002).
2. See Ely, supra note 1, at 31 ("It [eminent domain] requires that individual
owners relinquish their property without their consent."). For further discussion
on eminent domain, see infra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
3. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 4 (providing federal limits on eminent do-
main authority). For a further discussion of federal limitations on eminent do-
main authority, see infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text. State constitutions
also incorporate public use and just compensation limitations on eminent domain
authority. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("The property of no person shall be
taken for public use, withoutjust compensation therefor."); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8,
(341)
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Generally, just compensation can be ascertained; therefore, the extent of
government eminent domain authority turns on satisfaction of the public
use requirement.4 Despite the preeminent role of public use in eminent
domain, the precise confines of the requirement have proved elusive, leav-
ing the term "public use" without a distinct definition.
5
A prominent issue facing state and local governments across the
country is the validity of eminent domain as a tool for economic develop-
ment.6 The use of eminent domain as a means of spurring economic de-
cl. 6 ("Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
having been first made .... "); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a)
(same); PA. CONsT. art. I, § 10 ("[N]or shall private property be taken or applied to
public use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first
made or secured."); W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9 ("Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use, without just compensation .... "). For a complete list
of state eminent domain statutes, see 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01 [1],
n.3 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter NICHOLS].
4. See Russell A. Brine, Note, Containing the Effect of Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff on Takings for Private Industry, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 428, 441-42 (1986)
(viewing just compensation as primary restraint on government because govern-
ment will only utilize eminent domain to extent it is willing and able to pay for it).
The author argues that the just compensation limitation threatens to become inef-
fective when condemned property is intended for a private party and that party
provides the funding rather than the government. See id. (asserting that arrange-
ment in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229 (1984), where land was
transferred to private persons who provided funding, undermined limitation on
government's ability to pay for land); see also Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l
City Env., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2002) (noting that transferee automobile
racetrack agreed to pay all of development authority's expenses incurred for acqui-
sition of property), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002). The author foresees a particu-
lar threat in transfers where a resource rich corporation is the transferee. See
Brine, supra, at 442 (emphasizing corporations' easy access to capital, which could
facilitate and increase takings). This note focuses exclusively on the public use
requirement.
5. See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.11 (discussing multiple definitions of pub-
lic use). One commentator advocates a more extensive definition of public use as
a means of providing better guidance for the courts. See Camarin Madigan, Arti-
cle, Taking for Any Purpose?, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVWL. L. & POL'Y 179, 196
(2003) (arguing that United States Supreme Court should develop test to deter-
mine what fulfills public use). Another commentator suggests that public use can-
not and should not be defined. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.08 (arguing that
attempts to limit eminent domain by defining public use narrowly are ineffective).
6. See Ferris, supra note 1 (reporting that eminent domain proponents argue
condemnation of land by private entity will reinvigorate city center); Pristin, supra
note 1 (" [N]ew London city authorities said the condemnations were justified be-
cause the city, one of Connecticut's poorest, had endured three decades of eco-
nomic decline . .. and had few options for increasing its tax base to help pay for
schools and services."); Smith, supra note 1 ("MayorJames Quinn said Wednesday
that the city [authorized use of eminent domain] ... to assist Goodman Properties
LLC, which wants to build the 500,000-square-foot shopping center .... This is a
$40 million project that is very beneficial for the city tax ratables."); Twyman, supra
note 1 (writing that Philadelphia's Neighborhood Transformation Initiative was
designed to "strengthen[ ] the city's tax base by luring new residents" and that
Camden, NewJersey's eminent domain plans involved "a 10-year, $1.2 billion rede-
[Vol. 50: p. 341
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velopment generally refers to situations where property is taken by
governmental authority and then transferred to a private party under the
premise that subsequent development will benefit the public in ways such
as increasing tax revenue and generating employment. 7 Courts have
taken different positions on whether eminent domain may be used for
economic development. 8 The question arising in these cases is whether
the forced transfer of property from one private party to another private
party to facilitate economic development constitutes a public use.9
In its recent decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,10 in which the
County of Wayne sought to use eminent domain to build a business park,
the Michigan Supreme Court overturned its landmark decision in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,' which had approved the use of emi-
velopment plan that would relocate as many as 1,200 families to make way for new
homes, retail stores, a marina and a golf course").
7. See Ely, supra note 1, at 31 ("Such actions increasingly involve the taking of
one person's property for the benefit of private developers that will presumably
use the land in a manner consonant with a scheme for economically desirable
activity."). For examples of economic development cases, see infra note 8 and ac-
companying text.
8. See, e.g., 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1129-31 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (preventing use of eminent domain where city and
development agency attempted to condemn land of 99 Cents Only Store to allow
for expansion of wholesale retailer Costco in order to prevent Costco from relocat-
ing to another city), dismissed and remanded, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003);
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 508, 520 (Conn. 2004) (finding that
economic development satisfies public purpose requirement for both Connecticut
and federal constitutions and consequently upholds condemnation of New
London neighborhood for creation of hotel and office space), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 27 (2004); Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 9 (preventing development
agency from taking land from owner who intended to use it as landfill in order to
give it to automobile racetrack to build parking garage, but acknowledging that as
general proposition cotrt has found economic development to be "an important
public purpose"); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C.
2003) (denying county's right to use eminent domain to condemn property for
development of marine terminal because not sufficiently public).
Supporters of economic development defend the practice of utilizing the
power of eminent domain. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of National Congress for
Community Economic Development at 1, County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070-78) (asserting that "the power of eco-
nomic domain is an essential tool, albeit a tool of last resort, for achieving commu-
nities' social and economic goals"), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
gelpi/takings/courts/briefs.htm. National Congress for Community Economic
Development ("NCCED"), an advocacy group for the community development in-
dustry, argues that eminent domain power is necessary where the land is crucial to
development and resistance of property owners or attempts by property owners to
extort greater compensation could undermine projects. See id. at 5 (describing
market concerns).
9. See, e.g., Kelo, 843 A.2d at 531 (Conn. 2004), (determining that economic
development may satisfy public use requirement). For a discussion of Kelo, see
infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
10. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
11. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
3432005] NOTE
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nent domain to replace a neighborhood with an automotive plant.12 The
Poletown decision paved the way for the use of eminent domain as a means
of fostering economic development.1 3 Although the Hathcock decision
overruled Poletown, the court did not prohibit the use of eminent domain
for economic development. 14 Rather, the court set out three circum-
stances under which the taking of property and its transfer to a private
party may be characterized as a public use. 15 The court did not craft a
finite definition of public use, rather it relied on Michigan precedent to
delineate broad principles for determining what constitutes a public use
when there is a private beneficiary. 16 In addition, the court rejected the
deference to legislative determinations of public use adopted by
Poletown. 17
The court's refined interpretation curbs eminent domain power in
Michigan.' 8 The Hathcock decision is part of a renewed trend of limiting
government eminent domain authority. 19 The court's consideration of
when a taking subsequently transferred to a private party is a public use
may prove instructive for other jurisdictions. 20 At a minimum, the court's
decision to overrule Poletown may give pause to jurisdictions currently seek-
ing to employ eminent domain to facilitate economic development.
2 1
12. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787 (overruling Poletown).
13. For a discussion of the impact of Poletown, see infra notes 74, 76 and ac-
companying text.
14. For a discussion of how economic development can be accomplished
within the Hathcock reasoning, see infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
15. For public use determinations made by the Hathcock court, see infra text
accompanying notes 127-28.
16. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 780-83 (discussing what constitutes public
use). The court adopted Justice Ryan's dissenting analysis in Poletown, which set
forth the circumstances in which a taking had historically been considered a public
use. See id. at 781 (approving of Justice Ryan's reasoning).
17. For a discussion of the level of deference applied by the Hathcock court,
see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of Michigan's newly articulated limitations on eminent
domain, see infra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
19. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 581 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "there is a gathering
storm of public debate as to whether the use of eminent domain to acquire prop-
erty for private economic development in non-blighted areas is justified"), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004); Berliner, supra note 1, at 3 ("For many years, courts
simply rubber-stamped any use of eminent domain. In recent years, however,
courts have ruled against the government in a sizable minority of the cases where
the owners do challenge the condemnation.").
20. For a discussion of the reasoning of Hathcock, see infra notes 146-98 and
accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Tim Keller, Editorial, Michigan Ruling 3rd Strike for Giants'
Coronado Site, Amiz. REPUBLIc, Aug. 31, 2004, at 6 (asserting that Arizona courts
appear ready to follow reasoning in Hathcock, which likely means that Scottsdale
will be unable to take private property to build training facility for San Francisco
Giants). According to the Institute for Justice, forty-one states have filed or
threatened takings for private parties and the most often cited public purpose is
expected employment and tax benefits. See Berliner, supra note 1, at 2, 7 (arguing
344 [Vol. 50: p. 341
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This Note considers the viability of economic development as a public
use in light of the Hathcock decision. 2 2 Part II examines eminent domain
generally and then considers federal constitutional limits on public use.
23
Part III summarizes the facts of the Hathcock case.2 4 Part IV critically re-
views the Hathcock court's analysis of the public use limitation and suggests
that economic development is still an acceptable public use under certain
circumstances. 2 5 Finally, Part V considers the influence Hathcock may have
on other jurisdictions' determinations of whether economic development
constitutes a public use. 2
6
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background
Eminent domain represents the power of the government to take
property for public use without the consent of the owner.27 The power of
eminent domain is inherent in the sovereign, limited only by federal and
that allowing speculative justifications for eminent domain threatens all property
owners).
22. For a discussion of the implications of Hathcock, see infra notes 146-213
and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of eminent domain, see infra notes 27-45 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion regarding the federal constitutional interpretation of
public use, see infra notes 46-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
background of Poletown, see infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the Hathcock facts, see infra notes 95-110 and accompa-
nying text.
25. For a discussion of the reasoning in Hathcock, see infra notes 111-98 and
accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the impact of Hathcock, see infra notes 199-209 and
accompanying text.
27. See I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.11 ("Eminent domain is the power of the
sovereign to take property for 'public use' without the owner's consent."). An-
other author offers a broader definition of eminent domain:
Eminent domain is the right or power of the sovereign State to appropri-
ate private property to particular uses, for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare . .. . Doubtless the definitions which restrict eminent
domain to a taking for public use have been inspired by the constitu-
tional provisions which prevail in the United States and impose this limi-
tation on the exercise of the power.
JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 1
(1888).
Eminent domain necessarily implicates a conflict between government power
and property rights. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769
(Mich. 2004) (contrasting right of property owners to be secure in their property
and right of government to take land for public use). One author characterizes
property ownership as a fundamental tight "essential to the preservation of lib-
erty." Thomas J. Coyne, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem for
the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 388, 396
(1985); see also Ely, supra note 1, at 32 ("The framers of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights believed that security of property rights was necessary for the enjoyment of
individual liberty.., therefore ... they sought to restrict the exercise of eminent
domain . .. ").
20051 NOTE
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state constitutionally imposed requirements of public use and just com-
pensation. 28 By negative implication, the public use requirement prohib-
its a transfer of property for purely private use. 2 9
The sovereign's power to take property for public welfare has been
traced to the time of the Romans. 30 In the United States, colonies exer-
cised the power of eminent domain.3 l As America developed, govern-
ments took property for uses such as mills, private roads and iron works. 32
The states even used their eminent domain authority to acquire land on
behalf of the federal government, until the federal government began ex-
ercising the authority on its own behalf in 1875. 3 The evolution of state
and federal eminent domain authority has been defined by the interpreta-
tion of the public use limitation.3 4
The public use limitation has been interpreted in two ways, as a public
use and as a public benefit.3 5 The public use interpretation, which is con-
28. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 602-03 (1949) ("[T]he power of eminent domain is an
inherent attribute of sovereignty and exists without constitutional recognition;
therefore, constitutional provisions relating to eminent domain must be construed
as limitations upon, rather than grants of, power.").
While eminent domain power rests with the sovereign, this power may be del-
egated to other agencies or private individuals rather than being directly exercised
by the state. See H. P. Kucera, Eminent Domain Versus Police Power-A Common Mis-
conception, in INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 21 (Robert A. Wilson ed., 1959)
(describing eminent domain as "an inherent power of the sovereignty.... the
sovereign may grant it to whomever it may think proper . . . and deny it to all
others"); see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 774-76 (approving delegation of eminent
domain authority from state to county); Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500,
552 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
29. See LEWIS, supra note 27, § 157 (stating that courts agree that takings may
not be for private purpose); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.01 [5] ("Today, it is well
settled in every state that the prohibition against the taking of property for the
public use without just compensation implicitly, but nonetheless definitely, forbids
a taking of property for purely private uses."); Ely, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing
evolution of prohibition on transfers for private use from concept of natural law to
foundation in Due Process Clause).
30. See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.12[1] (noting that concept of sovereign's
authority to take property for public use dates back to Roman times). The intro-
duction of the term eminent domain is attributed to a 1625 work by Hugo Grotius
entitled De jure Belli et Pacis. See id. (relating history of eminent domain).
31. See Ely, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing use of eminent domain in colonies).
32. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.01 [3] (providing history of eminent do-
main); Ely, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing initial uses of eminent domain in Ameri-
can colonies).
33. See Comment, supra note 28, at 599 n.3 (noting that first federal eminent
domain case occurred in 1875 and discussing origins of federal eminent domain
jurisprudence).
34. For a discussion of the public use requirement, see infra notes 35-42 and
accompanying text.
35. See LEWIS, supra note 27, § 165 (expounding distinction between public
use and public benefit); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.02[2-3] (explaining public
use meaning versus public benefit meaning); Brine, supra note 4, at 429-31
(describing difference between public use and public benefit approach).
[Vol. 50: p. 341
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sidered the narrow reading, restricts takings to situations in which the
public will have access to the condemned property and be able to use it.
36
This narrow understanding encompasses condemnations for public facili-
ties such as highways, railroads and post offices.3 7 In contrast, public bene-
fit represents a more expansive interpretation that refers to situations
when the public receives an advantage or benefit from the condemna-
tion.38 The public benefit interpretation encompasses economic and so-
cial benefits that the public receives from the condemnation. 39 Unlike
the narrow interpretation, the public does not actually have to access or
use the property after the taking; rather, the people benefit from redistri-
bution of the property. 40 For example, many states justified the use of
eminent domain to take the land surrounding mills because it contributed
to the economy. 4' The takings permitted the mills to flood neighboring
property, facilitating the function of the mills and promoting commerce,
which benefited the community.
42
36. See LEwis, supra note 27, § 164 (discussing restrictive meaning of public
use); 2A NicHoLs, supra note 3, § 7.02 [2] (explaining narrow definition of public
use); Comment, supra note 28, at 603-08 (discussing narrow public use test and its
drawbacks).
37. See Ely, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing condemnation for railroads).
38. See LEwis, supra note 27, § 165 (discussing more permissive meaning of
public use); 2A NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.02[3] (explaining broad definition of
public use).
39. For an example of economic and social benefits, see infra note 42 and
accompanying text.
40. See 2A NIcHoLs, supra note 3, § 7.02 [3] (noting broad meaning of public
use includes enhancing resources, industry or productivity); see also LEwis, supra
note 27, § 165 (discussing more permissive meaning of public use). The author
advocates for a narrow application of public use. See id. § 165 (explaining disad-
vantages of public benefit interpretation). The author criticizes the broad ap-
proach. See id. ("[Public benefit] places the whole matter ultimately in the hands
of the judiciary ... under a particular statute [public use] may be readily deter-
mined from an inspection of the statute, but whether a particular improvement
will be of public utility is a question of opinion .... ").
41. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR.
L. REv. 203, 206 (1978) (discussing use of eminent domain to promote efficiency
of mills). The Michigan Supreme Court, however, rejected the legislative attempt
to justify eminent domain for mills in Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877). See id.
at 206 & n.21.
42. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 522 (Conn. 2004) (discuss-
ing Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866), in which Connecticut Supreme Court
allowed mill owner to flood neighbor's land as public use), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
27 (2004). "It would be difficult to conceive a greater public benefit than garner-
ing up the waste waters ... to turn machinery and drive mills, and thereby build up
cities and villages, and extend the business, the wealth, the population and the
prosperity of the state." See id. at 522 n.31 (quoting Olmstead, 33 Conn. at 550-51).
The Connecticut court took the broad view of the public use limitation when it
concluded that public access to the mill was not required in order to exercise
eminent domain. See id. at 522 (noting broad application of public use). For fur-
ther discussion of states exercising eminent domain for local mills, see Ely, supra
note 1, at 33 (discussing state action relating to mills).
2005] NOTE 347
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Courts play a distinct role in defining the public use requirement of
eminent domain.4 3 Generally, courts defer to legislative determinations
of public use because the legislature is considered more capable of assess-
ing whether the proposed use constitutes a public use sufficient to justify a
condemnation. 44 Ultimately, whether a legislature's pronouncement of
public use satisfies the constitutional requirement resides with the
courts.
4 5
B. Federal Constitutional Interpretation of the Public Use Limitation
Judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution define the parameters within which states may exercise emi-
nent domain power. 46 As federal eminent domain jurisprudence devel-
oped, the United States Supreme Court moved from the narrow public
use interpretation to the broad public benefit interpretation of the public
use limitation.4 7 Eventually, the Court explicitly adopted the broad public
benefit meaning in reference to the states' eminent domain power.48 In
its most recent decisions, the Court broadened the public benefit interpre-
tation even further by equating states' eminent domain power with their
police power, effectively removing federal limitations on states' eminent
domain authority. 49 Under this expansive approach, the Court has ap-
proved the transfer of property to private parties as consistent with public
use.
50
43. For a discussion of the judiciary's role in condemnation cases, see infra
notes 57, 63 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion ofjudicial deference, see infra note 57 and accompanying
text.
45. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 7.03[11] ("If, after giving due respect to a
legislative declaration, a court considers the purpose not to be reasonable or con-
nected to a valid public use, it is the duty of the court to declare the act authoriz-
ing the taking as unconstitutional.").
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 ("[N]or shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."). The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Coyne, supra note 27, at 388 n. 1 (citing Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 227 (1897)) ("Since 1897, the public use
and compensation requirements of the fifth amendment have applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.").
47. See Comment, supra note 28, at 610 (noting that early federal exercises of
eminent domain, such as taking land for parks, satisfied narrow public use test, but
that later takings found support in public benefit definition).
48. See id. at 609 ("In 1916 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated the 'use
by the public' test as applied to state takings and thereafter consistently refused to
recognize it.").
49. For an analogy of eminent domain to police power, see infra notes 55, 57,
65 and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of the most recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding public use limitations, see infra notes 51-68 and accompanying
text.
348
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In a 1954 case, Berman v. Parker,5 1 the Court upheld the transfer of
property to a private party when the District of Columbia condemned the
property in an effort to remove blight.52 The District of Columbia
planned to transfer some of the condemned property to private entities,
which would assist with redevelopment efforts. 53 The owners of an un-
blemished store within the blighted area argued that the taking was invalid
because the property was being taken for private use.54 The Court found
that Congress's determination that the condemnations served a public
purpose satisfied the public use requirement. 55 Moreover, the Court de-
ferred to Congress's assessment that private parties were essential to
achieving the goal of eliminating blight and redeveloping the neighbor-
hood.56 Although the final determination of public use remains with the
judiciary, the Court analogized the power of eminent domain to the police
power and declared that its power of review was severely limited.
5 7
51. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
52. See id. at 35-36 (finding public use requirement satisfied by public benefit
of blight removal and neighborhood revitalization).
53. See id. at 33 (explaining purpose of redevelopment efforts and means es-
tablished to accomplish elimination of blight). Congress, acting in its capacity as
city government for the District of Columbia, authorized the redevelopment of the
district through the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 ("Redevelop-
ment Act"). See id. at 28 (identifying statutory authority for condemnations). The
Redevelopment Act sought to eliminate the blight that threatened the public
health, safety and welfare of the city's inhabitants. See id. at 29 (noting goals of
Redevelopment Act). Congress declared that eliminating blight in the city and
redeveloping the area was a public use and that the task of redevelopment could
not be accomplished without private entities. See id. (describing steps necessary to
accomplish goals of Redevelopment Act). Congress authorized the establishment
of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency ("Agency") and dele-
gated the power of eminent domain to it. See id. (discussing establishment of
Agency for purpose of eliminating blight). After the approval of a comprehensive
plan, the Agency had the authority to begin acquiring land. See id. at 30 (explain-
ing procedure set forth in statute for development). Once land was acquired, the
Agency was to transfer the land intended for direct public use to public agencies
and sell or lease the rest of the land to private entities. See id. (noting statutory
preference for implementing redevelopment through private entities over public
agencies).
54. See id. at 31 (presenting owners' argument that taking their property vio-
lated their rights because their land was used for business, was not blighted hous-
ing and would be transferred to private entity for private use).
55. See id. at 32 (discussing legislative role in assessing public use). The Court
asserted that Congress lawfully exercised police power over the District of Colum-
bia and could use the interests of public health, safety and welfare to justify the
decision to improve the city environs through exercise of its eminent domain
power. See id. at 33 (acknowledging congressional authority to set agenda for city
and holding that Fifth Amendment does not impede those efforts).
56. See id. (defending transfer to private entity). "IT] he means of executing
the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public
purpose has been established.... The public end may be as well or better served
through an agency of private enterprise . . . or so the Congress might conclude."
Id. (citations omitted).
57. See id. (discussing eminent domain as means for achieving redevelop-
ment). For the Court, eminent domain was simply a means by which Congress
20051 NOTE
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The Court expanded the meaning of public use even further in Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff5 8 In Midkiff the Court reviewed the Ha-
waii Land Reform Act of 1967, which permitted Hawaiian officials to
redistribute land in order to fragment a local land oligopoly. 59 The state
viewed the oligopoly as an impediment to the free market economy of the
state. 60 The state proposed a solution-taking the property of the major-
ity lessors and transferring ownership to the lessees. 6 1 The Supreme
Court upheld the condemnations as a valid public use.
62
The Court reiterated a strong deference to legislative findings of pub-
lic purpose, affirmed limited court review and announced that the govern-
ment's use of eminent domain only had to be "rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose."63 Under this standard, the determination of
may implement redevelopment, which it is empowered to promote pursuant to its
police power over the District of Columbia. See id. at 32 (discussing congressional
police power authority). One commentator has criticized the Court's allusion to
police power in reference to the scope of eminent domain as unhelpful. See Ely,
supra note 1, at 34 ("This observation seemingly confused the extent of regulatory
authority with the eminent domain power and has bedeviled analysis of the public
use limitation ever since.").
The Berman decision is noted for the deference accorded to legislative deter-
minations of public use. See Coyne, supra note 27, at 391 (describing limited review
established by Berman as most deferential of Court's decisions, withstanding times
of war). The Berman court asserted that the congressional determination of public
use should be accorded significant deference. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("Subject
to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."). The Court further
stated: "The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exer-
cised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." Id.
58. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
59. See id. at 232-34 (discussing facts underlying Hawaii's attempt to redistrib-
ute land). In Hawaii at that time, the majority of land was owned by a small per-
centage of landowners who leased it to the remaining population. See id. at 232
(noting that according to Hawaii legislature 49% of land was government owned
and 47% was controlled by seventy-two private owners).
60. See id. at 232 (associating disproportionate property ownership with irreg-
ular real estate market, high land prices and injury to public welfare).
61. See id. at 233-34 (outlining procedures by which Hawaii arranged for
transfer of land from majority landowners to minority tenants).
62. See id. at 245 (upholding condemnations as rational effort by legislature to
combat severely disproportionate land ownership, not attempt to target specific
landowners). The Court found that the state's attempt to redistribute property was
a valid exercise of police power. See id. at 241-42 ("Regulating oligopoly and the
evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers.").
63. See id. at 241 ("[T]he Court has made clear that it will not substitute its
judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use 'unless
the use be palpably without reasonable foundation."' (quoting United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896))). The Court maintained that
courts have the ability to review legislative assertions of public use; however, the
Court sought to prevent courts from overstepping their authority and making de-
terminations that rightly belong to the legislature. See id. at 240-41 (clarifying role
of courts vis-A-vis legislative decision making). The Court also specifically noted
that deference to legislative decisions encompasses decisions made by state legisla-
tures. See id. at 244 (explaining that deference stems from American system of
[Vol. 50: p. 341
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public use did not depend on whether the intended public benefit materi-
alized-in this case altering the Hawaiian housing market-rather, the
analysis focused only on whether the goal itself was reasonable. 64 The
breadth of the Midkiff/Berman standard is underscored by the Court's ex-
pansion of the Berman police power reference-the Midkiff court declared
that eminent domain authority is "coterminous with the scope of a sover-
eign's police powers." 65 Moreover, the Court held that the benefit of the
condemnation did not have to be universally available; a public benefit
may satisfy the public use requirement even if only some members of the
community benefit. 66 Finally, the Court explained that a transfer to a pri-
government that puts legislatures in better position to determine public needs and
whether eminent domain properly fulfils those needs). One commentator consid-
ered the impact of such deference and asserted that, while such deferential treat-
ment did not guarantee that the condemnation would be upheld, the deference
provided a "strong presumption of constitutionality." See Coyne, supra note 27, at
393 (discussing consequences of deferential standard of review).
64. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 242 (stating that whether public purpose is fulfilled
is not concern that courts address). A court's role is to consider whether the legis-
lature rationally thought that the condemnations would accomplish the goals. See
id. (addressing role of courts in validating eminent domain power).
65. See id. at 240 (equating eminent domain with scope of police power). The
Court used the police power to explain the breadth of the term public use, but
police power remains a distinct concept from eminent domain. See Kucera, supra
note 28, at 6-7 (distinguishing between police power and eminent domain). One
commentator addressed the distinction between eminent domain and police
power:
It may be said that the state takes property under the eminent domain
power because it is useful to the public, and under the police power be-
cause it is harmful or because the property itself is the cause of the public
detriment. The real difference is that the police power when exercised within its
legitimate limits requires no compensation whereas eminent domain recognizes a
right to compensation. They have one element in common, and that is
force-under police power a person is ordered not to do or to do; under
eminent domain he is obliged by law to sell.
Id. Equating the reach of eminent domain with police power represents a shift
from previous views of public purpose. See LEWIS, supra note 27, § 163 (represent-
ing view that public use requirement is limitation that prevents eminent domain
from encompassing full police power). Another commentator discussed the effect
of the public use requirement on the scope of eminent domain power:
As the [eminent domain] power is by its nature limited to such purposes
as promote the general welfare, it is evident that the words public use, if
they are to be construed as a limitation, cannot be equivalent to the gen-
eral welfare or public good. They must receive a more restricted
definition.
Id. (describing public use limitation as having less breadth than promoting general
welfare, which is police power).
66. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 244 ("it is not essential that the entire community,
nor even any considerable portion .... directly enjoy or participate in any improve-
ment in order [for it] to constitute a public use." (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los Ange-
les, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923))). The Court utilized the broad interpretation of
public use, not the narrow one. See id. (rejecting narrow reading of public use); see
also LEWIS, supra note 27, § 161 (addressing required interaction of public and
condemned property in order to qualify as public use).
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vate party did not, by itself, invalidate a taking.6 7 The Midkiff decision
represents a firm step toward the states' increasingly unrestrained eminent
domain power.68
In 2004, the Court granted certiorari to Kelo v. City of New London,6 9 a
case in which the City of New London sought to condemn land for a new
business and residential development. 70 Kelo presents the Court with an
opportunity to address whether economic development satisfies the fed-
67. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 243-44 ("The mere fact that property taken out-
right by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries
does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.").
68. See Brine, supra note 4, at 441 ("[The Midki[f] rational basis test yields
wide latitude to the government in the use of eminent domain. Consequently, a
considerable expansion of state taking power could result if state courts choose to
follow the Midkiff approach."). The Midkiff ruling arguably expanded the reach of
the Berman decision. See id. at 428 (noting that Berman is last case before Midkiff to
address public use requirement of eminent domain); see also Mark C. Landry, The
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain-a Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REv. 419, 430
(1986) (arguing that condemnee would be unlikely to succeed in proving that
there is no rationally related public purpose for taking as required under Midkif/).
The Court may be reconsidering the scope of the public use requirement that it
set forth in Midkiff For a discussion of Supreme Court developments in that area,
see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
69. 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
70. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509-11 (Conn. 2004) (pro-
viding facts of New London's condemnation actions against property in Fort
Trumbull neighborhood), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004). The city intended to
capitalize on the recent arrival of a Pfizer global research facility by building office
space, a hotel, a conference center and new residences near the Pfizer complex.
See id. at 508-09 (explaining that city drafted various development plans regarding
site). The stated goal of the development included providing the city with tax and
revenue and creating jobs. See id. at 509 (conveying information from city's devel-
opment plan). Several homeowners resisted, sought an injunction and then ap-
pealed the trial court's denial of the injunction claiming, inter alia, that the trial
court erred in finding that the condemnations fulfilled state and federal public use
requirements. See id. at 508 (presenting background of case).
The Connecticut Supreme Court analyzed its historically broad interpretation
of public use under the state constitution, which included cases where blight and
instrumentalities of commerce constituted public use, and reviewed the broad ap-
proach taken by the United States Supreme Court on the same issue. See id. at
522-35 (reviewing Connecticut and federal approaches to public use). The court
concluded:
[E]conomic development plans that the appropriate legislative authority
rationally has determined will promote significant municipal economic
development by creating new jobs, increasing tax and other revenues,
and otherwise revitalizing distressed urban areas, constitute a valid public
use for the exercise of the eminent domain power under either the state
or federal constitution.
Id. at 531. The Kelo court cited similar rulings in other states and discussed
Poletown in detail. See id. at 528 n.39 (discussing cases).
In response to concerns that allowing economic development to satisfy public
use creates a great potential for abuse, the Kelo court asserted that judicial review
prevents excessive abuse. See id. at 535-36 (addressing concerns about abuse of
eminent domain power by emphasizing courts' ability to check such abuse). But
see Berliner, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasizing difficulties condemnees face to bring
or sustain actions to fight condemnations).
352
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eral Constitution's public use requirement.7 1 Specifically, the Court may
(i) approve the broad public use interpretation applied by the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court in Kelo, (ii) follow a more restrictive approach like that
set forth in Hathcock or (iii) devise a new scheme for assessing economic
development as a public use. 72 While the Michigan Supreme Court de-
cided Hathcock under Michigan law, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the federal public use requirement in Kelo may affect that ruling.73
C. Poletown and Its Implications
In 1981, Poletown demonstrated how aggressively a state could imple-
ment eminent domain under the broad public benefit approach to the
public use limitation.7 4 In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that the transfer of property to a private party for economic development
satisfied the public use requirement of the Michigan Constitution. 75 The
ruling changed the national landscape of eminent domain practice and
served as the basis for similar rulings across the country. 76
71. See Eminent Domain: Kelo v. New London, Conn., 73 U.S.L.W. 3102
(Aug. 10, 2004) (providing question presented in Kelo petition for certiorari, which
was granted). On behalf of the homeowners in Kelo, the Institute for Justice peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari with the following question:
"What protection does Fifth Amendment's public use requirement provide for in-
dividuals whose property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but
for sole purpose of 'economic development' that will perhaps increase tax reve-
nues and improve local economy?" See id. (reporting question presented).
72. See Iver Peterson, As Land Goes to Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at 29 ("The courts, including the Supreme Court, have
generally supported [the] argument that economic growth amounts to an overrid-
ing public benefit. But now [some] property rights campaigners and civil rights
advocates are hoping that the Supreme Court's decision to hear the New London
case could signal a shift.").
73. For a discussion of relationship between federal and state eminent do-
main jurisprudence, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. See Susan Crabtree, Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oak-
land Raiders and Poletown ?, 20 CAL. W. L. REv. 82, 83 (1984) ("The Poletown deci-
sion is a sharp departure from economic and residential redevelopment cases
wherein only slum clearance satisfied the public use element necessary for con-
demnation."); Editorial, Poletown and Property, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 3, 2004, at 10
("Poletown was the country's first major decision that said a government could seize
property and transfer it to private businesses."); Editorial, Supreme Court Restores
Sanctity of Property Rights, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 4, 2002, at 1OA ("Poletown opened the
door for land to be taken from one private owner and given to another private
party."); see also Coyne, supra note 27, at 397 (describing Poletown as "the most
egregious use, or abuse, of the taking power in recent history").
75. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,
459-60 (Mich. 1981) (permitting condemnation of neighborhood to build plant
that was expected to revitalize economy), overruled by City of Wayne v. Hathcock,
684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
76. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 528 n.39 (Conn. 2004)
("We conclude that [Poletown] warrants further discussion because it illustrates am-
ply how the use of eminent domain for a development project that benefits a pri-
vate entity nevertheless can rise to the level of a constitutionally valid public
benefit."), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004);Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, Note, The
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In 1980, General Motors ("GM") informed the City of Detroit it in-
tended to close two Detroit plants.7 7 GM indicated that it would build
another plant if a site could be found that satisfied its criteria.78 The only
area satisfying the company's criteria encompassed the Poletown neigh-
borhood. 79 Some members of the community resisted the city's efforts to
take their property, suing the city in a case that ultimately reached the
state supreme court.80 The appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court con-
cerned whether the use of eminent domain was unlawful because the city
was taking private property for a private, and not a public, use. 81
The court defined the issue before it as "whether the proposed con-
demnation is for the primary benefit of the public or the private user.
'
"82
The court began its analysis by noting that the "terms [public use and
public purpose] have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes" to
Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. REV. 783, 808 (1999)
(discussing influence of Poletown in elucidating meaning of public use in City of
Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1996)); Tresa Baldas,
Landmark Eminent Domain Case Overturned; Widespread Effects Seen in Ruling Limiting
Powers of Cities to Seize Land, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 2004, at 4 ("[Poletown] has been
cited favorably in 10 courts nationwide, and long [been] used by municipalities to
justify employing eminent domain for revitalization."); Poletown and Property, supra
note 74 ("State courts around the country cited the precedent [Poletown] to sup-
port the use of eminent domain for 'economic development' purposes.").
77. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (noting that
GM intended to close Cadillac and Fisher Body plants in Detroit).
78. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (describing GM's requirements for suita-
ble site to build new assembly complex).
79. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (explaining how GM and city chose area
to condemn).
80. See id. at 461 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (relating history of case). The
trial court ruled in favor of the city in a trial on the merits. See id. (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting) (noting facts of case). As a result, Michigan could initiate condemna-
tion actions under the "quick take" statute. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting)
(same). The Michigan Supreme Court agreed to hear the case prior to its review
in the state court of appeals. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (explaining proce-
dures that brought case to supreme court). The court also issued an injunction
pending the determination of the case. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (noting
actions of court).
81. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (relating history of case). The case
presented a second issue-whether the lower court had erred in ruling that the
neighborhood did not fall under the protections of the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act-that is not relevant to this Note. See id. (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting)
(finding that environmental act did not refer to society and culture of people).
82. See id. at 458 (assessing substance of case). The landowners did not ques-
tion that programs prescribed by the Michigan legislature to combat systemic un-
employment served a public purpose. See id. (indicating that landowners agreed
that program would benefit public). They questioned only whether procuring
land for a private party with the goal of improving the economy served a public
purpose. See id. (recounting that landowners disputed manner of implementing
program). The court noted that the parties agreed on the law: "All agree that
condemnation for a public use or purpose is permitted. All agree that condemna-
tion for a private use or purpose is forbidden." Id. Thus, the court had to address
whether the benefit to GM from the plant constituted an incidental or primary
benefit. See id. (identifying decisive issue).
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mean public benefit. 83 The court adopted the position that it only exer-
cises a limited review of the legislature's determination of public pur-
pose. 84 Nonetheless, the court held that a transfer that bestowed both
public and private benefits required the court to "inspect[ ] with height-
ened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest
being advanced."85 Specifically, the court noted that "[s]uch public bene-
fit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant if it
is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature."
8 6
The court found that the city had introduced enough evidence of
economic distress to support its assessment that the taking would provide
a public benefit significant enough to constitute a public use.8 7 At the
time, Michigan faced unemployment levels of 14.2% in the state, 18% in
Detroit and 30% for Detroit's black residents. 88 According to the plans,
GM intended to employ roughly 6,150 people at the plant and would pro-
vide property tax revenue of $15 million.89 The taking would displace
3,438 residents, destroy 1,176 structures and cost the city $200 million.90
The court characterized the benefits GM would receive-including the
83. See id. at 457 (explaining relation of public use and public purpose ac-
cording to Michigan precedent). "The term 'public use' has not received a narrow
or inelastic definition by this Court in prior cases." Id. For a discussion of the
inconsistency in the Poletown court's assertion of a distinction between public use
and public purpose, see infra note 137 and accompanying text.
84. See id. at 458-59 (discussing limited review because of presumption of va-
lidity). The legislature delegated its power to determine what constituted a public
purpose to the municipality. See id. at 459 (explaining how municipality could
exert power reserved for legislature). The court further limited its review because
the economic development in question fell within the types of projects considered
by the legislature to be for a public purpose and the required delegation proce-
dures had been properly followed. See id. (declaring court's minimal power of
review).
85. See id. at 459-60 (discussing need for heightened scrutiny when private
interest is benefiting from eminent domain action).
86. Id. at 460 (noting court's position regarding public benefit requirement).
87. See id. at 459 (explaining that dire need of city allowed transfer to private
party to be viewed as incidental benefit to private party). The court relied on a
statement by Justice Cooley, noting that "the most important consideration in the
case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing some public good which is
otherwise impracticable, and.., the law does not so much regard the means as the
need." Id. (citing People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Salem Township Bd.,
20 Mich. 452, 480-81 (1870)) (emphasis added). Under the standard of "some
public good," the court found the benefit to Detroit significant. See id. (explaining
position of court in determining sufficient public use).
88. See id. at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing statistics of Detroit's economic
conditions at time of Poletown).
89. See id. at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing environmental impact study's
description of plan to retain GM jobs and its impact on tax rolls).
90. See id. at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (detailing costs city incurred
in exercising eminent domain power). The taking of the Poletown neighborhood
actually resulted in the displacement of more than 4,200 people. See Ralph Nader
& Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REv. 207, 219 n.92
(2004) (discussing impact exercise of eminent domain had on Poletown).
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opportunity to purchase the site for only $8 million-as merely inciden-
tal. 9 1 Ruling for the city, the court affirmed the city's right to employ
eminent domain to condemn property and transfer it to a private party for
anticipated economic benefits. 92 These public benefits largely failed to
materialize-for example, at the height of its operations, the plant em-
ployed fewer than 3,000 employees. 93 Twenty-three years later, perhaps
with the knowledge that the anticipated Poletown benefits did not come to
fruition, the court reconsidered this revolutionary holding in Hathcock.94
III. FACTS OF CouNTY OF WAYNE V. HATHCOCK
For more than a decade, the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Air-
port has been undergoing a $2,000,000,000 renovation. 95 As the airport
expanded, concern arose that noise from the resultant additional air traf-
fic would disturb the surrounding landowners. 96 In response to these con-
cerns, the County of Wayne introduced a plan to buy property near the
airport.97 The county received funding for its plan from the Federal Avia-
tion Administration ("FAA"). 9 8 This arrangement stipulated that land
purchased with FAA funds had to be put to "economically productive
use."99 In an effort to satisfy the FAA requirement, the county developed
a plan, called the Pinnacle Project, to construct a 1,300-acre business and
technology park. 10 0 The county anticipated that the project would pro-
mote the economy and increase employment.1 0 1 In order to build the
91. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (viewing benefit to GM through land re-
distribution as incidental when compared with city's economic benefits).
92. See id. at 460 (holding legislative determination of public purpose in-
cluded transfer of property to private entity).
93. See Ilya Somin, Poletown Decision Did Not Create Desired Benefits, DETROIT
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2004, at 13A (speculating that more jobs may have been lost than
gained due to taking of businesses in Poletown). In addition, the majority of the
land acquired in Poletown was actually used for landscaping. See Nader & Hirsch,
supra note 90, at 222 n.109 (stating that less than half of land taken in Poletown was
actually utilized for plant and parking).
94. For a discussion of the Hathcock court's reasoning, see infra notes 111-45
and accompanying text.
95. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004) (dis-
cussing airport renovations). The renovation included a new terminal and a new
runway. See id. (relating facts of airport renovation); see also METROAIRPORT.COM,
Gaining Altitude, at http://www.metroairport.com/ (describing implementation of
capital improvement plan to improve Detroit's airport) (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
96. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770 (discussing concerns about airport noise).
97. See id. (describing program to buy surrounding land).
98. See id. (noting that Wayne County received $21 million grant from FAA
for noise abatement program).
99. See id. (discussing Wayne County's agreement with FAA).
100. See id. (identifying FAA agreement as impetus for Pinnacle Project and
crediting Jobs and Economic Development Department with idea of business
park). The business park would include a conference center, hotel and recrea-
tional facility. See id. (providing details about intended park).
101. See id. at 770-71 (noting county's assertion that project will "create
thousands ofjobs, and tens of millions of dollars in tax revenue, while broadening
[Vol. 50: p. 341
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park, the county began to purchase land through voluntary sales. 10 2 Ap-
proximately 300 acres short of its goal for the park, the county turned to
eminent domain proceedings to acquire the final forty-six properties
needed. 10 3 Of those forty-six properties, twenty-seven owners agreed to
sell based on new offers by the county. 1 04 The county initiated condemna-
tion actions against the landowners of the final nineteen properties.'
0 5
Faced with condemnation, the landowners sought review of the ac-
tion in the county circuit court. 10 6 Relying on Poletown, the trial court
determined that the Pinnacle Project fulfilled the public use requirement
of eminent domain. 10 7 Although the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's ruling, 10 8 the concurring opinion urged that Poletown be over-
the County's tax base[,] ... [aid] in [its] transformation from a high industrial
area... [and] attract national and international businesses, leading to accelerated
economic growth and revenue enhancement"). At trial, the county's expert testi-
fied that the project would add tax revenue of $350 million and result in 30,000
jobs. See id. at 771 (noting expert testimony).
102. See id. (describing county's attempts to acquire property). The county
had initially purchased 500 acres of noncontiguous land through the noise abate-
ment program. See id. (providing facts of case). The Pinnacle Project was de-
signed to create a 1,300-acre park that would include the 500 acres purchased
with the FAA funds. See id. (noting county's expectations for park). Through the
second round of voluntary sales, the county acquired an additional 500 acres of
land, bringing the total land held by the county to over 1,000 acres. See id. (detail-
ing county's efforts before resorting to eminent domain).
103. See id. ("The county apparently determined that further efforts to negoti-
ate additional voluntary sales would be futile and decided instead to invoke the
power of eminent domain."). The Wayne County Commission authorized the use
of eminent domain through a Resolution of Necessity and Declaration of Taking.
See id. (reciting procedures followed for eminent domain action).
104. See id. (noting that remaining parcels were appraised and, using apprais-
als, county had made written offers to remaining landowners); see also Uniform
Condemnation Procedures Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 213.51-.77 (2004) (establish-
ing requirements for condemnations).
105. See id. (stating that Wayne County brought proceedings under Uniform
Condemnation Procedure Act ("UCPA") in April 2001).
106. See id. (identifying argument by landowners that taking was not neces-
sary). The landowners offered three arguments: (1) the County did not have the
statutory authority to use eminent domain in this instance; (2) condemnation of
these properties did not satisfy the necessary requirement in the statute; and (3)
the condemnation was unconstitutional because the taking was not for a public
purpose. See id. (listing landowners' arguments).
107. See id. (presenting trial court's holding that "the takings were authorized
by MCL 213.23, that the county did not abuse its discretion in determining that
condemnation was necessary, and that the Pinnacle Project served a public pur-
pose as defined by Poletown"). The court also denied the landowner's motions for
reconsideration. See id. (noting denial of reconsideration).
108. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Nos. 239438, 2003 WL 1950233, at *6
(Mich. App. Apr. 24, 2003) (finding trial court did not err and upholding condem-
nation); see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771 (indicating that state court of appeals
affirmed trial court ruling). The court of appeals held that the condemnations did
not violate Michigan statutes or the state constitution and were consistent with
Poletown. See id. at 771-72 (noting findings of court of appeals).
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ruled.10 9 The landowners appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court,
which requested the parties address whether Poletown violated the state
constitution and should be overturned. 110
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
For the Michigan Supreme Court, Hathcock reflected the conflict be-
tween government authority and property rights inherent in eminent do-
main. 1 1 Assessing the validity of the county's attempt to take property for
the Pinnacle Project, the court found the condemnations satisfied the stat-
utory requirements, but violated the state's constitution, and the court
overruled Poletown.1 12
1. Statutory Analysis
The court began by analyzing the Michigan statute that authorizes the
taking of private property. 113 The court's analysis addressed three issues:
"whether the proposed condemnations are necessary for public purposes,
109. See Hathcock, 2003 WL 1950233, at *7-9 (Murray, J., concurring) ("[I]
believe with all due respect ... that the [Michigan] Supreme Court's decision in
[Poletown] was wrongly decided with respect to its constitutional determination
that the power of eminent domain can be utilized to take private property and
convey it for the use of other private entities in the name of improving the econ-
omy."); see also Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 772 ('Judge Murray, joined by judge Fitz-
gerald, concurred with Presiding Judge O'Connell, but opined that Poletown was
poorly reasoned, wrongly decided, and ripe for reversal by this Court.").
110. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 772 (granting landowners' appeal and asking
parties to address specific questions). The Michigan Supreme Court instructed
the parties to address specific issues:
(1) whether plaintiff has the authority, pursuant to MCL 213.23 or other-
wise, to take defendants' properties; (2) whether the proposed taking,
which are [sic] at least partly intended to result in later transfers to pri-
vate entities, are for a "public purpose," pursuant to Poletown Neighborhood
Council v Detroit, and (3) whether the "public purpose" test set forth in
Poletown is consistent with Const. 1963, art 10, § 2 and, if not, whether this
test should be overruled.
Id. (citations omitted).
111. See id. at 769 ("We are presented again with a clash of two bedrock prin-
ciples of our legal tradition: the sacrosanct right of individuals to dominion over
their private property, on the one hand and, on the other, the state's authority to
condemn private property for the commonwealth.").
112. See id. at 770 (summarizing holding).
113. See id. at 772 (indicating that court begins with statutory analysis to avoid
unnecessary constitutional analysis). The court reviews statutory construction de
novo. See id. (explaining standard of review). The Michigan condemnation statue
provides that "[a]ny public corporation or state agency is authorized to take pri-
vate property necessary for a public improvement or for the purposes of its incor-
poration or for public purposes within the scope of its powers for the use or
benefit of the public." MICH. COMP. LAws § 213.23 (1998). Under the UCPA, the
court may only review the determination that a condemnation was necessary. See
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 772 (explaining limits on standard of review under
UCPA).
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whether those purposes are within the scope of the county's powers, and
whether the takings are 'for the use or benefit of the public."'114 Regarding
necessity, a court must defer to a public corporation's finding of necessity
unless the opposing party establishes "fraud, error of law, or abuse of dis-
cretion."" 5 Finding the defendants' arguments unpersuasive, the court
declined to disturb the determination of necessity. 116 The court found
that the condemnations fell within the scope of the county's powers,
though the power was subject to constitutional and legislative con-
straints. 1 7 Finally, the court was not convinced that the condemnations
would fail to benefit the public within the meaning of the statute, saying
"[t] here is ample evidence in the record that the Pinnacle Project would
benefit the public." 1 8 Defendants did not dispute that the project bene-
fited the public; rather, they argued that any public benefits were out-
weighed by the private benefits. 119 The court disagreed and upheld the
project as a valid exercise of eminent domain under the statute.
120
114. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 773.
115. See id. at 776 (defining court's role in necessity questions).
116. See id. at 776-78 (refuting defendants' three arguments). The defend-
ants argued first that the county had not proven necessity because the county did
not have a specific purchaser or proof that the land would be used now or in the
future; second, the county had not fulfilled all of the procedural hurdles; and fi-
nally, the county did not show that the business park was necessary for public use.
See id. (discussing defendants' arguments). The court held that the lack of a spe-
cific buyer did not undermine the necessity and that the requirement for immedi-
ate use was based on a case involving a prior version of the constitution that had an
explicit requirement for immediate use and, further, was distinguishable because
the county did have immediate plans to develop the park. See id. at 777 (respond-
ing to defendants' first argument). The failure to fulfill all of the procedural re-
quirements was not dispositive because the statute did not require that all
procedures must be fulfilled to establish necessity. See id. (responding to defend-
ants' second argument). The defendants did not brief the question of whether the
county had proven necessity, but, nonetheless, the court held that the argument
was an unacceptable attempt to shift the burden to the plaintiff. See id. at 777-78
(responding to defendants' third argument).
117. See id. at 774-76 (analyzing authority of county to use eminent domain).
The analysis addressed two distinct issues: whether the county had the authority to
use eminent domain in general, and whether it could employ eminent domain in
this particular case. See id. at 773 (noting that issue of scope of county's powers
raised question of whether county had power of eminent domain at all, and, if so,
whether county had power in this specific instance).
118. See id. at 778 (discussing benefit to public). Both the plaintiffs and the
defendants agreed that the condemnations would benefit the public. See id. (not-
ing defendants did not question benefits of plan).
119. See id. (describing defendants' reliance on balancing test from City of
Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich. 1993)). The court dis-
puted the defendants' reliance on Edward Rose, because that case was not based on
MicH. COMP. LAws § 213.23 (1998), the statute at issue in Hathcock. See id. ("More-
over, Edward Rose nowhere suggests that the 'public use or benefit' element of
MCL 213.23 requires a balancing of public and private benefits, or that public
benefits must predominate over private ones under this statute.").
120. See id. (discussing defendants' argument).
19
Lewis: Strike That, Reverse It: County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Michigan Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
2. Constitutional Analysis
Although the condemnations were statutorily valid, the court held
that the condemnations violated Michigan's constitutional restriction re-
garding public use. 12 1 The validity of condemnations depends on the
breadth of the public use requirement. 122 The majority defined "public
use" by reference to how the ratifiers of the 1963 constitution who were
"sophisticated in the law" would have understood the term. 123 The court
declined to develop a definition of public use, but rather restricted its in-
terpretation to whether the condemnations in Hatheock were consistent
with the "sophisticated in the law" meaning of public use.124 Public use, as
defined by pre-1963 jurisprudence, did not prohibit the transfer of prop-
erty to private parties, but did prohibit the transfer of property to private
parties for private use.'
25
To establish when the Michigan Constitution permits property to be
transferred to a private party, the court adopted Justice Ryan's dissenting
121. See id. at 787 (holding that proposed condemnations "do not pass consti-
tutional muster"). "While the proposed condemnations satisfy the broad parame-
ters established by MCL 213.23, it must also be determined whether these
condemnations pass the more narrow requirements of our Constitution." Id. at
776. The Michigan Constitution states "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
122. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 779 (addressing argument that condemna-
tions do not satisfy public use requirement).
123. See id. at 779-81 (explaining process of constitutional analysis). The
court determined that "public use" is a term of art that must be analyzed according
to its "technical, legal sense" rather than according to the plain language of the
constitution. See id. ("We can uncover the common understanding of art. 10, § 2
only by delving into this body of case law, and thereby determining the 'common
understanding' among those sophisticated in the law at the time of the Constitu-
tion's ratification."). Because the term public use had been incorporated in the
1850, 1908 and 1963 versions of the Michigan Constitution, the majority found
that an analysis of the term required ascertaining the judicial interpretations that
were the underpinnings of the ratifiers' understanding of public use in 1963. See
id. at 780 (identifying public use as "a positive limit on the state's power of eminent
domain" in multiple constitutions).
By contrast, Justice Weaver rejected the majority's attempt to define public
use as a legal, technical term. See id. at 789 (Weaver,J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) ("Unlike the majority, I would employ the long-established method of
constitutional interpretation that restrains judges by requiring them to ascertain
the common understanding of the people who adopted the constitution."). In
Justice Weaver's view, the interpretation of public use should be the common un-
derstanding of the "learned and unlearned" rather than the "elitist" approach
adopted by the majority. See id. (Weaver, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("The majority's focus on the understanding of the 'sophisticated in the law' is
elitist; it perverts the primary rule of constitutional interpretation-that constitu-
tions must be interpreted as people, learned and unlearned, would commonly un-
derstand them.").
124. See id. at 781 (declining to create "single, comprehensive definition of
'public use"').
125. See id. (illustrating spectrum ofjudicial decisions on transfers to private
parties).
360 [Vol. 50: p. 341
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analysis in Poletown.1 2 6 The court identified three categories where such a
transfer satisfies the public use requirement.
12 7
[T]he transfer of condemned property to a private entity...
would be appropriate in one of three contexts: (1) where "public
necessity of the extreme sort" requires collective action; (2)
where the property remains subject to public oversight after
transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is selected
because of "facts of independent public significance," rather
than the interests of the private entity to which the property is
eventually transferred.
128
The first category-a public necessity of the extreme sort-refers to situa-
tions where the private party's use of the land will provide a public benefit
(e.g., highways and railroads) and can only be achieved if the government
uses its eminent domain power.' 29 The second category-public account-
ability-permits a transfer to a private party when some controls ensure
that the private party will remain accountable to the public.130 The third
category-condemnation as a public use-encompasses situations where
the public use is not how the property will be used after the taking, but
rather is the condemnation itself (e.g., clearing a slum is the public use,
making what happens to the property after the clearing incidental).131
126. See id. ("Accordingly, we conclude that the transfer of condemned prop-
erty is a 'public use' when it possess [sic] one of the three characteristics in our
pre-1963 case law identified by Justice Ryan.").
127. See id. at 781-83 (explicating criteria for public use). The court adopted
these criteria from the dissent of Justice Ryan in the Poletown case. See id. at 781
("Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent accurately describes the factors that distinguish
takings .... ").
128. Id. at 783. Despite disputing the majority's adoption of the three catego-
ries, Justice Weaver reached the same categories through her analysis of the case
law. See id. at 794-98 (Weaver, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (distilling
principles regarding eminent domain from cases). Rather than adopt the three
categories approach, Justice Weaver advocated a case-by-case approach where the
facts of the case are considered in the context of the common understanding of
public use. See id. at 798 (Weaver, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (advo-
cating case-by-case approach to protect rights of property owners).
129. See id. at 781-82 (discussing first characteristic generally and example of
railroads more specifically). "[T]his Court has held that the exercise of eminent
domain in such cases-in which collective action is needed to acquire land for vital
instrumentalities of commerce-is consistent with the constitutional 'public use'
requirement." Id. at 782.
130. See, e.g., Lakehead Pipe Line v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903, 912 (Mich. 1954)
(approving of controls state maintained over pipeline that was created through
eminent domain). For further discussion of Lakehead Pipe Line, see infra notes
174-75 and accompanying text.
131. See id. at 783 (providing example of slum clearance in which city's goal
was to remove property that endangered public welfare and resale of property re-
sulted in incidental private benefit). "[T]he act of condemnation itself, rather than
the use to which the condemned land eventually would be put, was a public use."
Id. The "facts of independent public significance" represent a motive for the con-
21
Lewis: Strike That, Reverse It: County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Michigan Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The court established that the Pinnacle Project did not fall within any
of these categories. 13 2 The project was not reliant on the government's
eminent domain intervention for its existence. 133 Moreover, the project
lacked any formal control that would ensure its continued utility for the
public. 134 Finally, the actual condemnation did not serve any public pur-
pose because it was not intended to clear slums or end blight.'3 5 Thus,
the court held that the county's plan to transfer property to a private party
was unconstitutional.
13 6
3. Reconsidering Poletown
The court's analysis then shifted to Poletown, upon which both the
circuit court and the state court of appeals had placed significant reliance
when ruling for the county. 13 7 The court described Poletown as "most no-
table for its radical and unabashed departure from the entirety of this
Court's pre-1963 eminent domain jurisprudence." 138  Specifically, the
court criticized two departures the decision made from past case law: first,
the Poletown court adopted limited judicial review of legislative determina-
tions of public use and, second, it accepted general economic benefits as a
valid public use.139 Rejecting that limited court review and advocating
demnation that is not based on the future use of the land, e.g., public health. See
id. (detailing meaning of "facts of independent public significance").
132. See id. ("[T]he Pinnacle Project and the subsequent transfer of those
properties to private entities-implicates none of the savings elements noted by
our pre-1963 eminent domain jurisprudence.").
133. See id. at 783-84 (averring that business and industrial parks are plentiful
and do not depend on eminent domain).
134. See id. at 784 (stating that plaintiffs plan would allow private parties to
pursue their own economic agenda without any guarantees that business will con-
tribute to economy).
135. See id. (finding benefit to public will accrue from private use of land, not
from act of condemning land).
136. See id. (concluding ratifiers "sophisticated in the law" would not have
viewed Pinnacle Project as valid exercise of eminent domain power).
137. See id. at 784-87 (examining reasoning in Poletown). The Hathcock court
first noted an internal inconsistency in the Poletown opinion regarding the prop-
erty owners' argument that a distinction existed between public use and public
purpose. See id. at 784 (noting inconsistency in Poletown reasoning). This distinc-
tion provided the foundation for the property owners' argument that Detroit's
condemnation action represented a public purpose, which did not satisfy the con-
stitutional public use requirement. See id. (describing property owners' argu-
ment). The Poletown court then claimed that the property owners admitted that
the constitution allowed property to be taken for public use or purpose. See id.
("The [Poletown] majority therefore contended that plaintiffs waived a distinction
they had 'urged' upon the Court."). Such an admission would have undermined
the landowners' argument. See id. (noting property owners' argument depended
on distinction). The Hathcock court noted that the inconsistency allowed the
Poletown court to skirt the issue of whether the transfer of private property to an-
other private party constituted a public use. See id. at 784-85 (identifying inconsis-
tency in Poletown reasoning).
138. Id. at 785.
139. See id. at 785-86 (identifying departures from past jurisprudence).
[Vol. 50: p. 341
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greater judicial review, the Hathcock court asserted that the Poletown court
improperly relied on persuasive authority to reach its holding, which was
inconsistent with Michigan precedent.' 40 "[T]his Court has never em-
ployed the minimal standard of review in an eminent domain case which is
adopted by the [Poletown] majority."14 1
The court also found that Michigan precedent did not support the
Poletown court's finding that a general contribution to local economic wel-
fare was sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement.1 4 2 The Hathcock
court considered such a lax public use standard to be a threat to property
owners. 1 43 "After all, if one's ownership of private property is forever sub-
ject to the government's determination that another private party would
put one's land to better use, then the ownership of real property is perpet-
ually threatened by the expansion plans of any large discount retailer,
'megastore,' or the like.' 44 Consequently, the court overruled Poletown
and restated its conclusion that the county's proposed condemnations vio-
lated the Michigan Constitution.
1 45
B. Critical Analysis
The Hathcock ruling provides a lens for examining the issue of taking
property from one private party and transferring it to another in the name
140. See id. (indicating disapproval of Poletown analysis). The Hathcock court
reasoned that the Poletown court improperly relied on two cases, Gregory Marina,
Inc. v. City of Detroit, 144 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. 1966), and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954), to limit its authority over eminent domain decisions because both were
merely persuasive authority vis-A-vis Michigan's eminent domain clause. See id. at
785 (discussing Poletown decision to limit review). Rather, under Michigan prece-
dent, the Michigan Supreme Court had not previously used a minimal standard of
review. See id. ("Notwithstanding explicit legislative findings, this Court has always
made an independent determination of what constitutes a public use for which the
power of eminent domain may be utilized" (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 475
(Ryan, J. dissenting))).
141. Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
142. See id. at 786 (discussing lack of precedent for Poletown decision).
143. See id. (asserting that allowing transfer of property to private party be-
cause private party "might" contribute to economy eviscerates constitutional limita-
tions on eminent domain power).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 787 (overruling Poletown). The court expressed the view that
the rationale of the Poletown decision would lead to unchecked use of eminent
domain power. See id. at 786 (discussing potential impact of Poletown decision).
Justice Weaver supported the decision to overrule Poletown. See id. at 788 (Weaver,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (explaining her reasoning).
The court applied its decision retroactively to "all pending cases in which a
challenge to Poletown has been raised and preserved." Id. Justice Weaver con-
curred with the retroactive application of the decision. See id. at 798 (Weaver, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (indicating support for decision to apply
holding retroactively). Justices Cavanagh and Kelly, in separate opinions, dis-
sented from the retroactive application of Hathcock. See id. at 799-800 (Cavanagh,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (asserting that retrospective application
of decision would unfairly penalize county for reliance on Poletown; Justice Kelly
agreed).
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of economic development. 14 6 Both Poletown and Hathcock indicate that
courts believe economic development can be sustained as a public use; the
cases diverge on the appropriate measures needed to assure that the pub-
lic use requirement is satisfied. 14 7 Although the Michigan court did not
address the federal interpretation of public use explicitly, it adopted a
more restrictive approach to public use under Michigan's constitution
than the United States Constitution currently requires.1 48 The elements
of the Hathcock approach-the three categories and a reduced level of def-
erence-together strike an appropriate balance between permitting eco-
nomic development and protecting property rights. 149
1. Categories
The Hathcock court did not reject economic development as a legiti-
mate public use.' 50 Rather, it provided a categorical framework for courts
146. For a discussion of the significance of the Poletown decision, see supra
notes 74, 76 and accompanying text. Poletown is considered a flashpoint of the
national move toward allowing economic development to constitute a public use.
For a discussion of that national shift, see supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying
text. The overruling of Poletown and the reasoning of Hathcock encourage reflec-
tions on the implications of repudiating such a significant case and raise considera-
tions about current trends in eminent domain. See, e.g., Dean Starkman, Michigan
Upholds Property Rights in Broad Ruling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at A6 ("In a deci-
sion with wide implications for property rights nationally, the Michigan Supreme
Court ruled that state and local governments may not take property from one pri-
vate owner and give it to another purely for the purpose of economic develop-
ment."); Supreme Court Restores Sanctity, supra note 74 ("Michigan's Supreme Court
restored the sanctity of private property rights .... The original case was a blow to
constitutional protections.").
147. For a discussion showing that the Poletown court agreed that economic
development served a public use and that the Hathcock court accepted the Pinnacle
Project as a valid public purpose under the statutory interpretation, see supra notes
87, 118 and accompanying text.
148. See Ely, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that some states took more restrictive
approach though most followed the Supreme Court on public use). For a discus-
sion of the relationship between federal and state public use requirements, see
supra note 46 and accompanying text. Here, the Hathcock approach was more lim-
ited than the state's police power allowed. Compare Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (equating scope of public use with scope of police power
and advocating deference), with Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (establishing three
categories under which transfer to private party satisfies public use requirement
and rejecting deferential review).
Changes may develop in the federal scope of the public use clause because the
United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New
London, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004) (granting certiorari for question of whether economic
development with possible tax and job benefits constitutes public use under Fifth
Amendment). For a discussion of Kelo, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying
text.
149. For an analysis of the Hathcock court's framework for ensuring the public
use requirement is satisfied for condemnations, see infra notes 150-98 and accom-
panying text.
150. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787 (concluding that condemnations in this
case do not satisfy public use, but not stating that economic development cannot
be public use). Despite the court's rejection of the Pinnacle Project, the court in
364 [Vol. 50: p. 341
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to assess the appropriateness of economic development as a public use.15 1
The majority identified three general categories where a condemnation
that is transferred to a private party is a public use. 152 Each of the court's
categorical distinctions can support some form of economic develop-
ment.153 The public necessity and the condemnation as a public use cate-
gories are both widely accepted as public uses.1 54 At the same time,
its statutory analysis explicitly acknowledged the benefits to the public from the
project. See id. at 778 (noting support for anticipated benefits of project).
151. For the court's language describing that categorical framework, see supra
text accompanying note 128. The ruling, however, does not represent the only
theory about how to balance economic development and property rights. See, e.g.,
Ely, supra note 1, at 36 (arguing that burden of proof should be on condemner
rather than condemnee and takings where private party benefits should engender
increased scrutiny).
152. For a discussion of the categories adopted in Hathcock, see supra notes
129-31 and accompanying text. WhileJustice Ryan's dissent in Poletown identified
these categories as common elements of cases dealing with instrumentalities of
commerce, the Hathcock court adopted them wholesale as instances where a taking
that is transferred to a private party constitutes a public use. See Poletown Neigh-
borhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 476 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting) (describing exception to general rule that property may not be trans-
ferred to private corporations, which "might be denominated the instrumentality
of commerce exception, [which] has permitted condemnation for the establish-
ment or improvement of the avenues of commerce-highways, railroads, and
canals, for example"). Consequently, the Hathcock majority's approach, which
does not require the condemnation to be an instrumentality of commerce, is
broader than Justice Ryan's formulation in Poletown. Compare Poletown, 304 N.W.2d
at 477-78 (Ryan, J., dissenting) ("Examination of the cases involving the instru-
mentalities of commerce exception reveal that three common elements appear in
those decisions that go far toward explicating and justifying the use of eminent
domain for private corporations . . . ."), with Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 n.56
("Although Justice Ryan viewed these common elements as 'exceptions' to the
general rule against condemnations for private use, the three exceptions reflect
concepts that are incorporated into the definition of 'public use,' given the princi-
ples of constitutional interpretation articulated above.").
153. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (listing criteria for public use). One
commentator suggests that the court did not make clear whether the criteria rep-
resented a conjunctive test. See Posting of Patrick A. Randolph, Jr.,
dirt@umkc.edu, to propertyprof@lists.washlaw.edu (Aug. 3, 2004) (on file with Vil-
lanova Law Review) ("Although the editor is uncertain, he believes that the court
intended that all three of these requirements must be satisfied if a condemnation
for private use is carried out."). The court, however, discusses the three categories
as independent of each other. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 ("[T]he transfer of
condemned property to a private entity ... would be appropriate in one of three
contexts: (1) ... ; (2) . . .; and (3) ....") (emphasis added). The designation "one
ofthree contexts" seemingly overrides the use of the conjunctive "and' in the list of
the three contexts, indicating a choice of categories. See id. (listing criteria for
public use) (emphasis added). The court also stated: "Accordingly, we conclude
that the transfer of condemned property is a 'public use' when it possess [sic] one
ofthe three characteristics in our pre-1963 case law identified by Justice Ryan." Id.
at 781 (emphasis added).
154. See Ely, supra note 1, at 33 ("[S] tate legislatures commonly granted canal,
turnpike, and railroad companies the authority to exercise eminent domain."). In
Swan v. Williams, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized historical examples of
the public necessity category. See Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427, 432 (1852)
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economic development opportunities are limited by the narrow scope of
these categories. 15 5 In contrast, public accountability provides communi-
ties with flexibility to seek economic development for uses that do not fall
within the other categories. 15 6 The expansiveness of this category will be
determined by judicial review. 157
a. Public Necessity
The first category adopted by the Michigan court was public necessity
requiring government intervention.15 8 The court defined this category as
including instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as railroads, high-
ways and canals. 159 The court referred to Swan v. Williams,1 60 where the
power of eminent domain was upheld for the purpose of developing a
railroad. 16 1 The Swan court viewed the construction of the railroad as a
public use because its purpose was to further communication and trans-
portation, both of which were accessible to the public; the revenue gener-
ated for the railroad, a private interest, was incidental to the public
benefit.16
2
b. Public Accountability
The second category requires that the public retain some element of
control over the condemned properties. 163 Although the court did not
indicate what type of control would have been necessary for the Pinnacle
("[TIhe whole policy of this country relative to roads, mills, bridges and canals,
rests upon [eminent domain], under which lands have always been condemned;
and without the exertion of this power, not one of the improvements just men-
tioned, could be constructed.") (citation omitted). Condemnation as a public use
is also widely recognized. See Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Env., L.L.C.,
768 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2002) ("Clearly, the taking of slums and blighted areas is
permitted for the purposes of clearance and redevelopment, regardless of the sub-
sequent use of the property."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002).
155. For a discussion of the public necessity and condemnation as public use
categories, see infra notes 158-62 and 179-85 and accompanying text, respectively.
156. For a discussion of the public accountability category, see infra notes
163-78 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the Hathcock court's rejection of limited judicial re-
view, see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
158. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (identifying first category).
159. See id. (explaining first category as defined by Justice Ryan's dissent in
Poletown). The court advocated condemnations under these circumstances based
on a concern that a single property owner could jeopardize a commercially neces-
sary project by refusing to sell or attempting to extort significant overpayment. See
id. at 781-82 (illustrating rationale behind first category).
160. 2 Mich. 427 (1852).
161. See id. at 443 (approving exercise of eminent domain for railroad, stating
"the provisions of the act of incorporation of the Detroit & Pontiac Railroad Com-
pany for condemnation of property are constitutional").
162. See id. at 436-37 (explaining how governmental purpose in permitting
eminent domain for railroads constituted public use and not private use).
163. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (explaining second category).
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Project to satisfy public use, the court cited its previous cases, Board of
Health v. Van Hoesen,1 64 Berrien Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit
Judge1 65 and Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn,16 6 as representative of the ex-
tent of control necessary to sustain a condemnation action.
167
In Van Hoesen, the court rejected public use arguments raised in an
attempt to take land for the expansion of a cemetery. 168 The Van Hoesen
court stated that, "[t]ojustify the condemnation of lands for a private cor-
poration, not only must the purpose be one in which the public has an
interest, but the state must have a voice in the manner in which the public
must avail itself of that use."1 69 The court in Berrien Springs blocked a con-
demnation by a private water power company. 170 The Berrien Springs court
rejected the taking because the company had the option to retain exclu-
sive control over the power generated.' 7' The potential for the con-
demned property's private use becoming the dominant use led the court
to reject the taking. 172 "The taking is not limited to what is required by
the public necessities... and the law contains no provision by which the
taking can be limited to such public necessities."173 By contrast, in Lake-
head Pipe Line, the court upheld the taking of a right-of-way for an oil pipe-
line. 1 74 The court approved of the controls the state maintained and
164. 49 N.W. 894 (Mich. 1891).
165. 94 N.W. 379 (Mich. 1903).
166. 64 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1954).
167. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784 ("[T] he Pinnacle Project is not subject to
public oversight to ensure that the property continues to be used for the common-
wealth after being sold to private entities."). The court did not elaborate on the
necessary amount of control needed, but cited Van Hoesen, Berrien Springs and Lake-
head Pipe Line. See id. at 782 (discussing past cases).
168. See Van Hoesen, 49 N.W. at 896-97 (arguing public would not exercise
any control over property, rather property would only be subject to will of
corporation).
169. Id. at 896. The Van Hoesen court specifically noted that the public did
not have a right to buy the land, the public did not maintain any control over the
property and the property could be sold to private individuals who could in turn
sell the land for a profit. See id. at 896-97 (quoting In re Deansville Ass'n, 66 N.Y.
569 (1876), which rejected cemetery as public use).
170. See Berrien Springs, 94 N.W. at 381 (preventing condemnation).
171. See id. at 380 ("And it is equally certain that, if the power be alternative
and optional, either for a public or for a private use . . . it cannot be upheld."
(quoting Attorney Gen. v. City of Eau Clare, 37 Wis. 400, 437 (1875))).
172. See id. ("It seems too plain for discussion that if the Legislature grant an
equivocal power, subject to the election of the grantee, for either one or other of
two purposes, the one lawful and the other unlawful, the power cannot be upheld
upon the chance its being lawfully applied." (quoting City of Eau Clare, 37 Wis. at
437)).
173. Id. at 381.
174. See Lakehead Pipe Line v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903, 910-12 (Mich. 1954)
(concluding that state had authority to exercise eminent domain over property for
operations proposed by plaintiff). Lakehead had been unable to purchase land
for a right-of-way to build a pipeline to transport oil from Canada and to transport
Michigan oil within Michigan. See id. at 906 (noting plaintiff's inability to obtain
right-of-way to construct pipeline). The company sought to condemn the land
20051 NOTE
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found that "the state has a certain measure of authority over plaintiff's
operations." 17
5
The Hathcock court's reference to these cases indicates that if a con-
demner imposes a mechanism of public accountability, the condemner
will be able to execute a condemnation predicated on economic develop-
ment.176 Public accountability provides the state flexibility to authorize
condemnations that do not satisfy the public necessity or condemnation as
public use categories. 1 77 From a property rights standpoint, the effective-
ness of this category depends on how restrictive the courts require control
to be.' 7
8
under Michigan statutory authority regulating the oil industry and conferring the
power of condemnation. See id. at 907-08 (providing statutory language support-
ing plaintiff's contention that condemnation of defendant's property was
authorized).
175. Id. at 912. The court was satisfied that the public had sufficient control.
See id. ("Not only has the plaintiff submitted itself to State jurisdiction with refer-
ence to the operations immediately contemplated, but it has pledged itself to
transport in intrastate commerce if given an opportunity to do so.").
176. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29-30 (1954) (noting statutory
controls). In Berman, the Supreme Court did not specifically address whether re-
taining control can enable a condemnation to be a public use. See id. at 30
(describing court's analysis). It is worthwhile to note, however, that the Court
quoted language from the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act that required
purchasers and lessees of the condemned land to conform to the comprehensive
plan developed pursuant to the Act. See id. ("The lessees or purchasers will carry
out the redevelopment plan and that 'no use shall be made of any land or real
property included in the lease or sale nor any building or structure constructed
erected thereon' which does not conform to the plan." (quoting District of Colum-
bia Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 790 (1954), §§ 7(d), 11))); Kelo v. City of
New London, 843 A.2d 500, 545 (Conn. 2004) ("[T]he terms of the development
plan providing parcel-specific land uses, to which private developers participating
in this project must adhere, provide significant control over the destiny of the
parcels."), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v.Jasper County,
586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (asserting that condemnation at issue does not
incorporate the "level of public control required [by] Karesh" and contrasting
Goldberg v. City Council of Charleston, 254 S.E.2d 803 (S.C. 1979)). In Karesh v. City
Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978), the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina, under its narrow public use treatment, declared that the city's efforts to con-
demn land for a parking garage where the garage would be under a long-term
lease to the developer did not satisfy the public use requirement. See Ga. Dept. of
Transp., 586 S.E.2d at 856 (discussing Karesh). By contrast, in Goldbrig, the court
held that the same garage satisfied the public use requirement when the city
owned and operated the garage. See id. (contrasting Goldberg). Contra Kelo, 843
A.2d at 583 (ZarellaJ., dissenting in part) (criticizing majority's reliance solely on
statutory and contractual provisions as control and advocating that test should also
include whether public will actually benefit as determined by trial court without
deference to legislature).
177. For a discussion of the public necessity and condemnation as public use
categories, see supra notes 158-62 and infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text,
respectively.
178. For an explanation of the deference used by the court in public use
cases, see infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
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c. Condemnation as Public Use
The third category concerns condemnations where the condemna-
tion itself represents the public use.1 79 In these circumstances, the con-
demnation serves two functions: elimination of blight and
redevelopment. 180 The elimination of blight is the public use and the
resultant economic development is merely an added benefit.1 8 1 In these
situations, the private benefit is deemed incidental to the goal of improv-
ing public welfare by eliminating blight.182 The Hathcock court illustrated
this category by referencing In re Slum Clearance.183 In that case, the court
upheld the use of eminent domain "for the purpose of eliminating hous-
ing conditions detrimental to the public peace, health, safety, morals and
welfare, and to aid in replanning and reconstruction of the area in-
volved."' 84 The court held the primary purpose was removing blight, mak-
ing the resale of land incidental. 185
While these categories can stand alone, they are not mutually exclu-
sive.' 86 When discussing the public accountability category, the Hathcock
court acknowledged the Swan case as an example of both public accounta-
bility and public necessity. 187 The Swan court approved the governmental
control imposed on the railroad, emphasizing a provision that "se-
cure[d]... all such rights to the use of this road by others" and noting that
179. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782-83 (Mich. 2004)
(discussing third category in which condemnation of property itself is public use).
180. See, e.g., In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340, 341 (Mich. 1951) (stating
that condemnation served to clear slum and reconstruct area); see also Berman, 348
U.S. at 29 (noting purpose of redevelopment agency is to use eminent domain to
take property for "the redevelopment of blighted territory in the District of Colum-
bia" (quoting District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, § 5(a))). For fur-
ther discussion, see infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
181. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (explaining third category as "meaning
that the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation" is public use). For
the proposition that the act of condemning is the public use, not the ultimate
disposition of the land, the court cites In re Slum Clearance, where the controlling
public purpose for condemning properties was removing blight. See id. (discussing
In re Slum Clearance as example of third category).
182. See id. (noting that city's purpose in In re Slum Clearance was to remove
blight, thus, subsequent sale of land to private parties was incidental).
183. 50 N.W.2d,340 (Mich. 1951).
184. See id. at 341 (noting purpose of condemnation proceedings that gave
rise to suit).
185. See id. at 343 (explaining public benefit). The In re Slum Clearance court
rejected the defendant's reliance on Van Hoesen, indicating that the holding in Van
Hoesen did not establish a blanket prohibition against allowing public corporations
to condemn. See id. at 342 (discussing holding in Van Hoesen). The court also
distinguished Berrien Springs, explaining that the concomitant conflicting public,
private uses in Berrien Springs differed from sequential public, private uses in In re
Slum Clearance. See id. at 343 (distinguishing Berrein Springs).
186. For a discussion of the disjunctive nature of the common elements test,
see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
187. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 n.61 (noting Justice Ryan's reference to
control in Swan).
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both the government and public could rely on the courts to enforce the
act's requirement that the land be used only for a railroad.1 88
Having held that only these three categories justify transferring con-
demned land to a private party, the Hathcock court criticized Poletown's ac-
ceptance of a general economic contribution as a public use.189 The
Hathcock court viewed the economic benefits in Poletown as "vague" and
considered condemnation that "might contribute to the economy's
health" an insufficient public use. 190 Nonetheless, this was a fact-based
criticism; the court did not entirely dismiss the concept of economic devel-
opment as public use.19 1 Although the court overruled Poletown because a
general economic benefit alone did not fit within the three categories, the
court did not foreclose the possibility that Poletown would have been sus-
tained had it also fallen within one of the categories, such as public
accountability.1 9 2
2. Judicial Review of Public Use Determinations
For the Michigan Supreme Court, the overruling of Poletown cor-
rected an aberration in its eminent domain jurisprudence.193 The Hath-
cock court rejected Poletown's minimal standard of review for eminent
domain cases.' 9 4 Adopting Justice Ryan's dissenting analysis in Poletown,
the Hathcock court agreed that the deference the Poletown court showed
the legislative determination of public purpose was not based on control-
ling authority. 1 95 "Notwithstanding explicit legislative findings, this Court
has always made an independent determination of what constitutes a public
use for which the power of eminent domain may be utilized."1 96 The
Hathcock majority affirmed that "[q]uestions of public purpose aside,
whether the proposed condemnations were consistent with the Constitu-
tion's 'public use' requirement was a constitutional question squarely
188. See Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427, 439-40 (1852) (finding that statutory
authority of railroad provided for sufficient control to preserve public use).
189. For a discussion of that criticism, see supra notes 142-44 and accompany-
ing text.
190. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786 (dismissing Poletown court's position that
general economic benefit meets public use requirement).
191. See id. ("Justice Cooley was careful to point out that the Court was not
ruling out the possibility that 'incidental benefits to the public' might, in some
cases, 'justify an exercise of the right of eminent domain.'" (quoting Ryerson v.
Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 339 (1877))).
192. See id. (indicating that general economic benefit that does not also fall
within one of categories is insufficient to satisfy public use clause).
193. See id. at 785 (characterizing Poletown as "radical and unabashed depar-
ture" from precedent).
194. See id. (rejecting minimal review).
195. See id. (noting that cases relied on by Poletown majority were not binding
authority for Michigan court).
196. Id. (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 475 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)), overruled by Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d at 787).
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within the Court's authority."197 Thus, the court reasserted its power to
assess the constitutionality of the purported public use of the condemna-
tion, which provides property owners the protection of limited deference
without foreclosing economic development as a valid public use.
1 98
V. IMPACT
Within the scope of the federal public use requirement, state courts
determine the breadth of eminent domain authority under their state con-
stitutions, which results in varied outcomes.1 99 Frequently, courts are
faced with determining whether economic development constitutes a pub-
lic use. 200
The Hathcock ruling illustrates the Michigan court's efforts to find the
balance between property owners' rights and the government's eminent
domain power by imposing a stricter public use requirement. 20 1 Given
the notoriety of Poletown, its demise symbolizes an effort to impose greater
restrictions on eminent domain and a rejection of general economic bene-
fit as a public use. 20 2 Yet, economic development as a means of improving
communities should not be readily dismissed as not fulfilling a public
use.
2 0 3
197. Id.
198. See id. (advocating court's role in reviewing eminent domain cases). Va-
rious authorities also support greater judicial review. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500, 587 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (proposing four step burden-shifting process for judicial review), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004); see also Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent
Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of
the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 285, 311-13 (2000) (proposing use of
strict scrutiny in eminent domain such that "condemning authority must demon-
strate a compelling public need").
199. See generally Berliner, supra note 1, at 10-217 (reporting states' various
approaches to eminent domain and providing examples of condemnation activity
in each state). For a discussion of the relationship between federal and state inter-
pretations of public use, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. For court rul-
ings regarding eminent domain, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
200. For different state interpretations of the public use limitation, see supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
201. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786-87 (adopting test for transfer of prop-
erty to private parties based on public uses accepted before 1963 while not explic-
itly rejecting or accepting economic development as public use). The court did
not, as the NCCED feared, erect constitutional limitations that would permanently
bar communities from achieving their goals. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Na-
tional Congress for Community Economic Development at 26-27, County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070-78) (urging court
not to create restriction that in effect would completely impede development),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/takings/courts/briefs.htm.
202. For a discussion of the impact of Poletown's reversal, see supra note 146
and accompanying text.
203. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 778 (acknowledging benefits that Pinnacle
Project would have based on evidence in record); Ely, supra note 1, at 32 ("The
Takings Clause was little debated at the time of its ratification, but nothing indi-
cates that the framers envisioned a departure from settled practice .... Given the
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The Hathcock decision provides three categories of public use that en-
able economic development under certain circumstances. 20 4 The ruling
provides the greatest latitude for condemners to implement economic de-
velopment under the public accountability category.20 5 Public accounta-
bility provides jurisdictions with flexibility because courts can determine
the degree of control required by their state constitutions. 20 6 By imposing
an element of governmental control, a state may use eminent domain as a
means of achieving community economic development while simultane-
ously preventing rampant abuse of property rights. 20 7 The rejection of
minimal judicial review enables Michigan courts to assess whether con-
demnations satisfy the constitutional requirement of public use, thereby
further protecting property owners.208 Thus, the Michigan ruling does
not prevent the use of economic development for eminent domain, it
merely requires that the economic development fall within three catego-
ries-public necessity, public accountability or condemnation as a public
use-and pass judicial review.20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Communities strive to foster their economies and protect property
rights-often balancing conflicting interests. 2 10 When the use of eminent
domain to facilitate economic development is contested, courts differ on
colonial experience, one cannot reasonably formulate a categorical rule that pri-
vate property could never be taken for developmental purposes."). Alternatively,
another commentator argues that economic development should be left to the
legislatures and should not be determined by the courts. See Madigan, supra note
5, at 194 ("Therefore, the court should leave the issues of development to the
politics of the legislature. The legislators, elected individuals, are publicly account-
able to their constituents."). The legislature makes informed decision-making
through lobbying efforts and public hearings, which provide information the
courts do not have. See id. at 194 (asserting that court should not have intervened
in 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D.
Cal. 2001), dismissed and remanded, 60 Fed. Appx. 123, 125 (9th Cir. 2003) (vacating
appeal because case rendered moot)).
204. For a discussion of the determinations of public use set forth in Hathcock,
see supra notes 150-92 and accompanying text. Contra Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500, 543 (Conn. 2004) (approving of economic development as
public use where legislature has made rational determination of benefits), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 27 (2004).
205. For a discussion of imposing control as a means of limiting public use,
see supra notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of cases from other jurisdictions that address control,
see supra note 176.
207. For a discussion of the public accountability category, see supra notes
163-78 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of the court's rejection of limited judicial review, see
supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
209. For a critical discussion of the categorical approach and standards of
judicial review, see supra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the conflict stemming from economic interests and
eminent domain, see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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whether economic development satisfies the constitutional requirement of
public use.2 11 To serve the divergent interests of the public and the prop-
erty owners, courts must find a balance that facilitates economic develop-
ment without unnecessarily infringing on property rights. 2 12 The Hathcock
decision presents one such approach for balancing these interests; it re-
mains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will approve the broad pub-
lic use approach in Kelo, support the more restrictive Hathcock holding or
delineate a new test.
213
Rachel A. Lewis
211. For a discussion of cases discussing public use, see supra note 8 and ac-
companying text.
212. For a discussion of examples of courts' efforts to balance economic and
property interests, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. The United States Su-
preme Court will have the opportunity to define the appropriate balance or create
a new test entirely when it rules on Kelo. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
27 (2004) (granting certiorari).
213. For an analysis of the Hathcock court's approach, see supra notes 149-98
and accompanying text. See also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 27 (providing Court with occasion
to consider whether economic development satisfies public use requirement).
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